Globalization, Inequality, and Corruption
AbstractThis paper presents new empirical evidence on the determinants of corruption, focussing on the role of globalization and inequality. The estimates for a panel of 102 countries over the period 1995-2005 point to three main results: i) Detection technologies, reflected in a high level of development, human capital, and political rights reduce corruption, whereas natural resource rents increase corruption. ii) Globalization (in terms of both trade and financial openness) has a negative effect on corruption, which is more pronounced in developing countries. iii) Inequality increases corruption, and once the role of inequality is accounted for, the impact of globalization on corruption is halved. In line with recent theory, this suggests that globalization – besides reducing corruption through enhanced competition – affects corruption also by reducing inequality.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Vienna University of Economics, Department of Economics in its series Department of Economics Working Papers with number wuwp139.
Date of creation: Apr 2012
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Globalization; inequality; corruption;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F1 - International Economics - - Trade
- F3 - International Economics - - International Finance
- F4 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance
- O1 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
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