An Axiomatic Approach to the Airline Emission Fees Problem
AbstractAn airline lands in a number of airports in a region. An airport serves a number of airlines. Each airport charges a given amount of emission fees to those airlines using the airport. The total emission fees from all airports in the region must be shared among all airlines. We propose an axiomatic approach to this airline emission fees problem. We suggest a sharing rule called the Decomposition rule that is based on a few simple axioms. The Decomposition rule coincides with the Shapley value of the game associated with the problem and is shown in the core. Thus, no alliance of airlines can reduce their emission fees by forming an independent coalition. On the other hand, we also show that the Decomposition rule is split-proof. In other words, no airline has an incentive to split into two or more airlines.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Windsor, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 1308.
Length: 10 pages
Date of creation: 26 Aug 2013
Date of revision:
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Airline emission fees; Shapley value; core; split-proofness.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-08-31 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENV-2013-08-31 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2013-08-31 (Game Theory)
- NEP-TRE-2013-08-31 (Transport Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Yves Sprumont, 2005. "On the Discrete Version of the Aumann-Shapley Cost-Sharing Method," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 73(5), pages 1693-1712, 09.
- Jens Leth Hougaard & HervÃ© Moulin, 2012. "Sharing the Cost of Redundant Items," MSAP Working Paper Series 06_2012, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics.
- S. C. Littlechild & G. Owen, 1973. "A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case," Management Science, INFORMS, INFORMS, vol. 20(3), pages 370-372, November.
- Moulin, Herve & Laigret, Francois, 2011. "Equal-need sharing of a network under connectivity constraints," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 314-320, May.
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