This paper introduces a matching model of credit and exchange in which potentiel difficulties in the enforcement of contracts play a central role. The repeated games framework that is developed is used to analyze the pricing and availability of credit, the consequences of information monopoly in credit markets, and the effect of the introduction of a credit intermediary on economic activity. The model generates and endogenous credit limit and highlights the importance of enduring relations. Also studied are the effects on the pricing and availability of credit of improvements in production technology, of sanctions, and of the value of collateral.
Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page
whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be
available.
Find related papers by JEL classification: E51 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers O31 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives C51 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Model Construction and Estimation