Anarchy, State, and Dystopia: Venezuelan Economic Institutions before the Advent of Oil
AbstractThis paper studies the evolution of Venezuelan economic institutions before the emergence of oil exploitation in 1920. We argue that by 1920 Venezuela had developed a highly centralized state and a professionalized military. These two institutions ensured that growing oil revenues would strengthen the state structure and protected Venezuela from the resource-conflict trap into which many oil-abundant countries have fallen. We also argue that the failure to develop institutions that could mediate between sectoral demands and the state, the subordination of property rights to political imperatives and the political dominance of the commercial-financial elite conditioned the nation’s response to the post-1920 influx of oil revenues.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Wesleyan University, Department of Economics in its series Wesleyan Economics Working Papers with number 2006-018.
Length: 41 pages
Date of creation: May 2006
Date of revision:
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-12-04 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENE-2006-12-04 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-HIS-2006-12-04 (Business, Economic & Financial History)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Lederman, Daniel & Maloney, William F., 2008.
"In search of the missing resource curse,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
4766, The World Bank.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Manolis Kaparakis).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.