Masami Imai () (Economics and East Asian Studies, Wesleyan University)
Abstract
This paper uses newly compiled data on Thai family businesses and their direct participation in politics to examine whether the political participation of family business yields private economic payoff. The paper finds that the political participation of family members is positively associated with the profitability of family businesses. Furthermore, this “political benefit” is found to be particularly large when firms are connected to the cabinet members. These results support the crony capitalism view that powerful business groups in Thailand have an incentive to directly hold influential public offices in order to influence the economic policy in their favor.
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Wesleyan University, Department of Economics in its series Wesleyan Economics Working Papers with number
2006-017.
Length: 28 pages Date of creation: May 2006 Date of revision: Publication status: Published in Asian Economic Journa (Vol. 20 No 3, 241-256) on-line at http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/toc/asej/20/3 . Handle: RePEc:wes:weswpa:2006-017
Find related papers by JEL classification: G38 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Government Policy and Regulation O53 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economywide Country Studies - - - Asia including Middle East P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: