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Family Control and the Rent-Seeking Society

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  • Randall Morck

    ()

  • Bernard Yeung

    ()

Abstract

The small number of very large family-controlled corporate groups in many countries combined with their long continuity of control and ability to act discretely give these organizations a comparative advantage in political rent-seeking. This advantage is a key part of a self-reinforcing system whereby oligarchic family corporate control, political rent seeking, and low general levels of trust combine to stymie growth.

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File URL: http://www.wdi.umich.edu/files/Publications/WorkingPapers/wp585.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan in its series William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series with number 585.

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Length: 49 pages
Date of creation: 12 Feb 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wdi:papers:2003-585

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