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Incentive Contracts and Hedge Fund Management

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  • Jens Carsten Jackwerth
  • James Hodder

Abstract

This paper investigates dynamically optimal risk-taking by an expected-utility maximizing manager of a hedge fund. We examine the effects of variations on a compensation structure that includes a percentage management fee, a performance incentive for exceeding a specified highwater mark, and managerial ownership of fund shares. In our basic model, there is an exogenous liquidation barrier where the fund is shut down due to poor performance. We also consider extensions where the manager can voluntarily choose to shut down the fund as well as to enhance the fund’s Sharpe Ratio through additional effort. We find managerial risk-taking which differs considerably from the optimal risk-taking for a fund investor with the same utility function. In some portions of the state space, the manager takes extreme risks. In another area, she pursues a lock-in style strategy. Indeed, the manager’s optimal behavior even results in a trimodal return distribution. We find that seemingly minor changes in the compensation structure can have major implications for risk-taking. Additionally, we are able to compare results from our more general model with those from several recent papers that turn out to be focused on differing parts of the larger picture.

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Paper provided by Warwick Business School, Finance Group in its series Working Papers with number wp05-10.

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Date of creation: 2005
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Handle: RePEc:wbs:wpaper:wp05-10

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References

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  1. William N. Goetzmann & Jonathan E. Ingersoll & Stephen A. Ross, 2003. "High-Water Marks and Hedge Fund Management Contracts," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(4), pages 1685-1718, 08.
  2. Fung, William & Hsieh, David A, 1997. "Empirical Characteristics of Dynamic Trading Strategies: The Case of Hedge Funds," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 10(2), pages 275-302.
  3. Stavros Panageas & Mark M. Westerfield, 2009. "High-Water Marks: High Risk Appetites? Convex Compensation, Long Horizons, and Portfolio Choice," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 64(1), pages 1-36, 02.
  4. William N. Goetzmann & Jonathan E. Ingersoll, Jr. & Stephen A. Ross, 2004. "High Water Marks," Yale School of Management Working Papers ysm22, Yale School of Management.
  5. Fung, William & Hsieh, David A., 1999. "A primer on hedge funds," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 309-331, September.
  6. Jennifer N. Carpenter, 2000. "Does Option Compensation Increase Managerial Risk Appetite?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(5), pages 2311-2331, October.
  7. Judith A. Chevalier & Glenn D. Ellison, 1995. "Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives," NBER Working Papers 5234, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  8. Basak, Suleyman & Shapiro, Alex & Teplá, Lucie, 2005. "Risk Management with Benchmarking," CEPR Discussion Papers 5187, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  9. Merton, Robert C, 1974. "On the Pricing of Corporate Debt: The Risk Structure of Interest Rates," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 29(2), pages 449-70, May.
  10. Basak, Suleyman & Pavlova, Anna & Shapiro, Alex, 2006. "Optimal Asset Allocation and Risk Shifting in Money Management," CEPR Discussion Papers 5524, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  11. Merton, Robert C, 1969. "Lifetime Portfolio Selection under Uncertainty: The Continuous-Time Case," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 51(3), pages 247-57, August.
  12. Basak, Suleyman & Pavlova, Anna & Shapiro, Alex, 2005. "Offsetting the Incentives: Risk Shifting and Benefits of Benchmarking in Money Management," CEPR Discussion Papers 5006, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  13. Stephen A. Ross, 2004. "Compensation, Incentives, and the Duality of Risk Aversion and Riskiness," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 59(1), pages 207-225, 02.
  14. Jennifer Carpenter, 1999. "Does Option Compensation Increase Managerial Risk Appetite?," New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires 99-076, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-.
  15. Bebchuk, Lucian Arye & Fried, Jesse, 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem," CEPR Discussion Papers 3961, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  16. Bebchuk, Lucian A. & Fried, Jesse M., 2003. "Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem," Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics, Working Paper Series qt81q3136r, Berkeley Olin Program in Law & Economics.
  17. Stephen J. Brown, 2001. "Careers and Survival: Competition and Risk in the Hedge Fund and CTA Industry," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 56(5), pages 1869-1886, October.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Suleyman Basak & Anna Pavlova & Alexander Shapiro, 2007. "Optimal Asset Allocation and Risk Shifting in Money Management," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 20(5), pages 1583-1621, 2007 21.
  2. Jens Carsten Jackwerth & James E. Hodder, 2008. "Managerial Responses to Incentives: Control of Firm Risk, Derivative Pricing Implications, and Outside Wealth Management," CoFE Discussion Paper 08-07, Center of Finance and Econometrics, University of Konstanz.
  3. Jens Carsten Jackwerth & James Hodder, 2005. "Employee Stock Options: Much More Valuable Than You Thought," Working Papers wp05-09, Warwick Business School, Finance Group.
  4. Serge Darolles & Christian Gouriéroux, 2013. "The Effects of Management and Provision Accounts on Hedge Fund Returns - Part I : The High Water Mark Scheme," Working Papers 2013-22, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique.
  5. Gong Zhan, 2011. "Manager fee contracts and managerial incentives," Review of Derivatives Research, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 205-239, July.
  6. Lan, Yingcong & Wang, Neng & Yang, Jinqiang, 2013. "The economics of hedge funds," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(2), pages 300-323.
  7. Castaneda, Pablo, 2005. "Portfolio Choice and Benchmarking: The Case of the Unemployment Insurance Fund in Chile," MPRA Paper 3346, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 30 Dec 2006.
  8. Basak, Suleyman & Pavlova, Anna & Shapiro, Alex, 2003. "Offsetting the Incentives: Risk Shifting and Benefits of Benchmarking in Money Management," Working papers 4303-03, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
  9. G. Elaut & M. Frömmel & J. Sjödin, 2014. "Crystallization – the Hidden Dimension of Hedge Funds' Fee Structure," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 14/872, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
  10. Agarwal, Vikas & Ray, Sugata, 2011. "Determinants and implications of fee changes in the hedge fund industry," CFR Working Papers 11-09, University of Cologne, Centre for Financial Research (CFR).
  11. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2010. "Incentives in Hedge Funds," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-714, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  12. Kolokolova, Olga, 2011. "Strategic behavior within families of hedge funds," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(7), pages 1645-1662, July.
  13. Peyton Young & Dean P Foster, 2008. "The Hedge Fund Game," Economics Papers 2008-W01, Economics Group, Nuffield College, University of Oxford.
  14. Franke, Günter & Krahnen, Jan Pieter, 2008. "The future of securitization," CFS Working Paper Series 2008/31, Center for Financial Studies (CFS).

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