Heterogeneity, distribution, and cooperation in common property resource management
AbstractThe report considers the role of group heterogeneity in the success or failure of common property resource management. The author argues that cooperative agreements are less likely to come about when agents are highly heterogeneous along relevant dimensions - and existing agreements are more likely to break down as a group becomes more heterogeneous. The author crystallizes his argument in simple numerical examples and illustrates by reference to case studies on common property resource management, in particular, cases involving fisheries and irrigation systems. More work is needed to substantiate the author's argument, but his analysis so far supports the argument that equity and efficiency complement rather than oppose each other.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 844.
Date of creation: 31 Jan 1992
Date of revision:
Agricultural Research; Agricultural Knowledge&Information Systems; Poverty Assessment; Common Property Resource Development; Environmental Economics&Policies;
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