Conditional cash transfers, political participation, and voting behavior
AbstractThis paper estimates the effect of enrollment in a large scale anti-poverty program in Colombia, Familias en Accion, on intent to vote, turnout and electoral choice. For identification the analysis uses discontinuities in program eligibility and variation in program enrollment across voting booths. It finds that Familias en Accion had a positive effect on political participation in the 2010 presidential elections by increasing the probability that program beneficiaries registered to vote and cast a ballot, particularly among women. Regarding voter's choice, the authors find that program participants expressed a stronger preference for the official party that implemented and expanded the program. Overall, the findings show that voters respond to targeted transfers and that these transfers can foster support for incumbents, thus making the case for designing political and legislative mechanisms, as the laws recently passed by the Colombian government, that avoid successful anti-poverty schemes from being captured by political patronage.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 6215.
Date of creation: 01 Oct 2012
Date of revision:
Parliamentary Government; Population Policies; Politics and Government; Political Systems and Analysis; E-Government;
Other versions of this item:
- Baez, Javier E. & Camacho, Adriana & Conover, Emily & Zárate, Román Andrés, 2012. "Conditional Cash Transfers, Political Participation, and Voting Behavior," IZA Discussion Papers 6870, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Javier E. Baez & Adriana Camacho & Emily Conover & Román A. Zárate, 2012. "Conditional Cash Transfers, Political Participation, and Voting Behavior," DOCUMENTOS CEDE 010312, UNIVERSIDAD DE LOS ANDES-CEDE.
- O10 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-10-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2012-10-13 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2012-10-13 (Positive Political Economics)
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