The incidence of graft on developing-country firms
Abstract
This paper measures the extent to which firms in developing countries are the target of bribes. Using new firm-level survey data from 33 African and Latin American countries, we first show that perceptions adjust slowly tofirms'experience with corrupt officials and hence are an imperfect proxy for the true incidence of graft. We then construct an experience-based index that reflects the probability that a firm will be asked for a bribe in order to complete a specified set of business transactions. On average, African firms are three times as likely to be asked for bribes as are firms in Latin America, although there is substantial variation within each region. Last, we show that graft appears to be more prevalent in countries with excessive regulation and where democracy is weak. In particular, our results suggest that the incidence of graft in Africa would fall by approximately 85 percent if countries in the region had levels of democracy and regulation similar to those that exist in Latin America.Download Info
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.Bibliographic Info
Paper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 4394.Length:
Date of creation: 01 Nov 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:4394
Contact details of provider:
Postal: 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20433
Phone: (202) 477-1234
Email:
Web page: http://www.worldbank.org/
More information through EDIRC
Related research
Keywords: Public Sector Corruption&Anticorruption Measures; Corruption&Anitcorruption Law; Crime and Society; E-Business; Access to Finance;This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AFR-2007-11-24 (Africa)
- NEP-ALL-2007-11-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-DEV-2007-11-24 (Development)
- NEP-POL-2007-11-24 (Positive Political Economics)
- NEP-REG-2007-11-24 (Regulation)
References
No references listed on IDEASYou can help add them by filling out this form.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Hallward-Driemeier, Mary & Khun-Jush, Gita & Pritchett, Lant, 2010.
"Deals versus rules : policy implementation uncertainty and why firms hate it,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
5321, The World Bank.
- Hallward-Driemeier, Mary & Khun-Jush, Gita & Pritchett, Lant, 2010. "Deals versus Rules: Policy Implementation Uncertainty and Why Firms Hate It," Working Paper Series rwp10-027, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
- Mary Hallward-Driemeier & Gita Khun-Jush & Lant Pritchett, 2010. "Deals versus Rules: Policy Implementation Uncertainty and Why Firms Hate It," NBER Working Papers 16001, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Hallward-Driemeier, Mary & Khun-Jush, Gita & Pritchett, Lant, 2010. "Deals Versus Rules: Policy Implementation Uncertainty and Why Firms Hate It," Scholarly Articles 4448884, Harvard Kennedy School of Government.
- Clarke, George R.G., 2011.
"How Petty is Petty Corruption? Evidence from Firm Surveys in Africa,"
World Development,
Elsevier, vol. 39(7), pages 1122-1132, July.
- Clarke, George, 2008. "How petty is petty corruption? Evidence from firm survey in Africa," MPRA Paper 15073, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 24 Aug 2008.
- Clarke, George R.G., 2011. "Firm Registration and Bribes: Results from a Microenterprise Survey in Africa," MPRA Paper 31857, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Anos-Casero, Paloma & Udomsaph, Charles, 2009. "What drives firm productivity growth ?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4841, The World Bank.
Lists
This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:4394For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Roula I. Yazigi).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

