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Policing unfair imports : the U.S. example

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  • Finger, J. Michael
  • Murray, Tracy

Abstract

This paper researched the numbers on U.S. import cases to find out how the Unites States uses antidumping and countervailing duty actions to regulate imports. It describes the procedures followed by the Commerce Department and the International Trade Commission, surveys cases and outcomes in the 1980's and analyzes what drives the unfair trade laws. The pattern of petitions and results, it concludes, suggests strongly that injury to U.S. producers beset by import competition is whatthe antidumping and countervailing duty laws are about. That is why the pattern of antidumping cases is not particularly different from the pattern of antisubsidy cases - and why the frequency of cases against politically powerful countries is the same as the frequency of cases against politically weaker ones. The political strength of the exporting country does influence the form of import restriction the U.S. government will use. A powerful country will receive the courtesy of a negotiated settlement. A less powerful country will in due course receive determinations through normal administrative procedures. In short, unfair trade cases are where the action is because they are broad enough to handle all the action.

Suggested Citation

  • Finger, J. Michael & Murray, Tracy, 1990. "Policing unfair imports : the U.S. example," Policy Research Working Paper Series 401, The World Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:401
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. J.M. Finger & H. Keith Hall & Douglas R. Nelson, 2002. "The Political Economy of Administered Protection," Chapters, in: Institutions and Trade Policy, chapter 8, pages 81-95, Edward Elgar Publishing.
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    Cited by:

    1. Cletus C. Coughlin, 1991. "U.S. trade-remedy laws: do they facilitate or hinder free trade?," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jul, pages 3-18.
    2. Nogues, Julio J. & Baracat, Elias, 2005. "Political economy of antidumping and safeguards in Argentina," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3587, The World Bank.
    3. Banks, Gary, 1990. "Australia's antidumping experience," Policy Research Working Paper Series 551, The World Bank.
    4. Angelika Eymann & Ludger Schuknecht, 1996. "Antidumping Policy In The European Community: Political Discretion Or Technical Determination," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(2), pages 111-131, July.
    5. D. Greenaway, 1991. "The Uruguay Round Of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Last Chance For Gatt?," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 42(3), pages 365-379, September.
    6. Phedon Nicolaides, 1990. "Anti-dumping measures as safeguards: the case of the EC," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics;Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), vol. 25(6), pages 273-279, November.
    7. Primo Braga, Carlos Alberto & Silber, Simao Davi, 1991. "Brazilian frozen concentrated orange juice : the folly of unfair trade cases," Policy Research Working Paper Series 687, The World Bank.
    8. Khan, Nadeem, 1994. "Firm's behavior in the presence of antidumping laws," ISU General Staff Papers 1994010108000011487, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
    9. Thomas J. Prusa, 1998. "Cumulation and Anti‐dumping: A Challenge to Competition," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 21(8), pages 1021-1033, November.
    10. Klaus Stegemann, 1991. "The International Regulation of Dumping: Protection Made Too Easy," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(4), pages 375-405, December.
    11. Michael Davenport, 1990. "The economics of antidumping and the Uruguay Round," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics;Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), vol. 25(6), pages 267-273, November.
    12. Mustapha SADNI JALLAB, 2007. "The Political Influence Of European And American Antidumping Decisions: Some Empirical Evidence," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 6(18), pages 1-8.
    13. Drabek, Zdenek & Laird, Sam, 1997. "The new liberalism: Trade policy developments in emerging markets," WTO Staff Working Papers ERAD-97-07, World Trade Organization (WTO), Economic Research and Statistics Division.
    14. Laird, Samuel, 1992. "Non-tariff measures in hemispheric FTA negotiations," Sede de la CEPAL en Santiago (Estudios e Investigaciones) 33909, Naciones Unidas Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL).
    15. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:6:y:2007:i:18:p:1-8 is not listed on IDEAS

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