Who bears the cost of Russia's military draft?
AbstractThe authors use data from a large nationally representative survey in Russia to analyze the distributional and welfare implications of draft avoidance as a common response to Russia's highly unpopular conscription system. They develop a simple theoretical model that describes household compliance decisions with respect to enlistment. The authors use several econometric techniques to estimate the effect of various household characteristics on the probability of serving in the army and the implications for household income. Their results indicate that the burden of conscription falls disproportionately on the poor. Poor, rural households, with a low level of education, are more likely to have sons who are enlisted than urban, wealthy, and better-educated families. The losses incurred by the poor are disproportionately large and exceed the statutory rates of personal income taxes.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 3547.
Date of creation: 01 Mar 2005
Date of revision:
Poverty Lines; Peace&Peacekeeping; Housing&Human Habitats; Economic Theory&Research; Environmental Economics&Policies;
Other versions of this item:
- Michael Lokshin & Ruslan Yemtsov, 2008. "Who bears the cost of Russia's military draft?," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 16(3), pages 359-387, 07.
- NEP-ALL-2005-12-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-CIS-2005-12-14 (Confederation of Independent States)
- NEP-TRA-2005-12-14 (Transition Economics)
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- Poutvaara, Panu & Wagener, Andreas, 2009.
"The Political Economy of Conscription,"
IZA Discussion Papers
4429, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Poutvaara, Panu & Wagener, Andreas, . "The political economy of conscription," Chapters in Economics, University of Munich, Department of Economics, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
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