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Who bears the cost of Russia's military draft?

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Author Info

  • Lokshin, Michael
  • Yemtsov, Ruslan

Abstract

The authors use data from a large nationally representative survey in Russia to analyze the distributional and welfare implications of draft avoidance as a common response to Russia's highly unpopular conscription system. They develop a simple theoretical model that describes household compliance decisions with respect to enlistment. The authors use several econometric techniques to estimate the effect of various household characteristics on the probability of serving in the army and the implications for household income. Their results indicate that the burden of conscription falls disproportionately on the poor. Poor, rural households, with a low level of education, are more likely to have sons who are enlisted than urban, wealthy, and better-educated families. The losses incurred by the poor are disproportionately large and exceed the statutory rates of personal income taxes.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 3547.

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Date of creation: 01 Mar 2005
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Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:3547

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Related research

Keywords: Poverty Lines; Peace&Peacekeeping; Housing&Human Habitats; Economic Theory&Research; Environmental Economics&Policies;

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Cited by:
  1. Panu Poutvaara & Andreas Wagener, 2009. "The Political Economy of Conscription," CESifo Working Paper Series 2821, CESifo Group Munich.

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