This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

How stronger patent protection in India might affect the behavior of transnational pharaceutical industries

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Fink, Carsten

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

To address questions about how stronger patent rights will affect India's pharmaceutical industry, the author simulates the effects of introducing such protection - as required by the World trade Organization Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) - on market structure and static consumer welfare. (India must amend its current patent regime by 2005 and establish a transitional regime in the meanwhile.) The mode the author uses accounts for the complex demand structure for pharmaceutical goods. Consumers can choose among various drugs available to treat a specific disease. And for each drug, they have a choice among various differentiated brands. The author calibrates the model for two groups of drugs - quinolonnes and synthetic hypotensives - using 1992 brad-level data. In both groups, a subset of all available drugs was patent-protected in Western Europe but no India, where Indian manufacturers freely imitated them. The simulation analysis asks how the market structure for the two groups of drugs would have looked if India had granted patents for drugs. It does not take account of the fact that stronger patent protection will not apply to existing drugs and that the Indian government might be able to restrain high drug prices by imposing price controls or granting compulsory licenses. Still, the author concludes that if future drug discoveries are mainly new varieties of already existing therapeutic treatments, the effect of stronger patent protection is likely to be small, If newly discovered drugs are medicinal breakthroughs, however, prices may rise significantly above competitive levels and static welfare losses may be large. If demand is highly price-elastic, as is likely in India, profits for transnational corporations are likely to be small, but if private health insurance is permitted in India, reducing the price-sensitivity of demand, patent-holders'profits could increase substantially. In light of the fact that the TRIPS Agreement strengthens patent rights in most developing countries, pharmaceutical companies may do more research on, for example, tropical diseases.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2000/06/27/000094946_00060905463269/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 2352.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 31 May 2000
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:2352

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20433
Email:
Web page: http://www.worldbank.org/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Roula I. Yazigi).

Related research
Keywords: Real&Intellectual Property Law; Markets and Market Access; Environmental Economics&Policies; Economic Theory&Research; Water and Industry; Markets and Market Access; Access to Markets; Water and Industry; Economic Theory&Research; Environmental Economics&Policies;

Other versions of this item:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Richard E. Baldwin & Paul Krugman, 1986. "Market Access and International Competition: A Simulation Study of 16K Random Access Memories," NBER Working Papers 1936, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Dunning, John H, 1979. "Explaining Changing Patterns of International Production: In Defence of the Eclectic Theory," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 41(4), pages 269-95, November.
  3. Lanjouw, J.O., 1997. "The Introduction of Pharmaceutical Product Patents in India: "Heartless Exploitation of the Poor and Suffering"?," Papers 775, Yale - Economic Growth Center.
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Shubham Chaudhuri & Pinelopi K. Goldberg & Panle Jia, 2003. "Estimating the Effects of Global Patent Protection in Pharmaceuticals: A Case Study of Quinolones in India," NBER Working Papers 10159, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Pradhan, Jaya Prakash, 2006. "Global Competitiveness of Indian Pharmaceutical Industry: Trends and Strategies," MPRA Paper 12340, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  3. Li, Xuan, 2008. "The Impact of Higher Standards in Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical Industries under the TRIPS Agreement: A Comparative Study of China and India," Working Papers RP2008/36, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER). [Downloadable!]
  4. Lee Branstetter & Raymond Fisman & C. Fritz Foley & Kamal Saggi, 2007. "Intellectual Property Rights, Imitation, and Foreign Direct Investment: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 13033, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Alka Chadha, 2005. "Trips and Patenting Activity: Evidence from the Indian Pharmaceutical Industry," Departmental Working Papers wp0512, National University of Singapore, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  6. Francesco Laforgia & Fabio Montobbio & Luigi Orsenigo, 2007. "IPRs, technological and industrial development and growth: the case of the pharmaceutical industry," CESPRI Working Papers 206, CESPRI, Centre for Research on Innovation and Internationalisation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy, revised Oct 2007. [Downloadable!]
  7. Shubham Chaudhuri & Pinelopi K. Goldberg & Panle Jia, 2003. "The Effects of Extending Intellectual Property Rights Protection to Developing Countries: A Case Study of the Indian Pharmaceutical," Discussion Papers 0304-08, Columbia University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Gehl Sampath, Padmashree, 2006. "Indian Pharma Within Global Reach?," UNU-MERIT Working Paper Series 031, United Nations University, Maastricht Economic and social Research and training centre on Innovation and Technology. [Downloadable!]
  9. Shubham Chaudhuri, 2006. "Estimating the Effects of Global Patent Protection in Pharmaceuticals: A Case Study of Quinolones in India," Working Papers id:772, esocialsciences.com. [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? The RePEc project started in 1997. Its precursor, NetEc, dates back to 1993.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-26.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.