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Why privatize? : the case of Argentina's public provincial banks

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  • Clarke, George R.
  • Cull, Robert

Abstract

Argentina has been a leader among developing countries in restructuring its banking sector. The authors analyze the performance of those banks before and after privatization and estimate fiscal savings associated with privatizingArgentina's banks rather than keeping them public and later recapitalizing them. The authors describe the process of privatization, including the creation of residual entities for the assets and liabilities of public provincial banks that private buyers found unattractive and the creation of a special fund (the Fondo Fiduciario) to convert the short-term liabilities of the residual entities into longer-term obligations. They argue that the Fondo, created through cooperation between the Argentine federal government and the World Bank, was key in making privatization of the banks politically feasible. Argentina privatized roughly half of its public provincial banks. The Argentine experience suggests that bank privatization may succeed only when accompanied by a sound, incentive-compatible system of prudential regulation. The regulatory environment affects a bank s solvency. Improved regulation and supervision alone does not deliver the same benefits as improved regulation and supervision with privatization. The provincial banks that remained in the public sector did not demonstrate the same performance gains as privatized provincial banks. The decision to maintain a public provincial bank is a costly one. Policymakers should expect privatization to pass through some or all of the following steps: 1) With respect to pre-privatization audits, expect losses hidden in these banks to be larger than those indicated in prior audits. 2) If residual entities are created, expect them to hold a large share of the old public provincial bank, if the quality of its loan portfolio was low. 3) Do not expect the price paid for the privatized entity (the so-called good bank) to be great, at least compared with assets and liabilities in the residual entity. 4) If the residual entity is large, the province will be confronted with substantial short-term liabilities. But with assistance and an aggressive asset recovery strategy, governments should be able to navigate their way through short-term difficulty. 5) The costs of privatization are less than the costs of future recapitalization, even if the near-term management of the residual entity does not go well.

Suggested Citation

  • Clarke, George R. & Cull, Robert, 1998. "Why privatize? : the case of Argentina's public provincial banks," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1972, The World Bank.
  • Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:1972
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Levine, Ross & Zervos, Sara, 1998. "Stock Markets, Banks, and Economic Growth," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(3), pages 537-558, June.
    2. Jeffert Aberbanellv & John Bonin, 1997. "Bank Privatization in Poland: The Case of Bank Slaki," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 4, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
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    6. Abarbanell, Jeffery S. & Bonin, John P., 1997. "Bank Privatization in Poland: The Case of Bank Slaski," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 31-61, August.
    7. Talley, Samuel H. & Mas, Ignacio, 1990. "Deposit insurance in developing countries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 548, The World Bank.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Payment Systems&Infrastructure; Banks&Banking Reform; Municipal Financial Management; International Terrorism&Counterterrorism; Economic Theory&Research; Banks&Banking Reform; Municipal Financial Management; Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring; Economic Theory&Research; International Terrorism&Counterterrorism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

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