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International commodity control : retrospect and prospect

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Author Info
Gilbert, Christopher L.
Abstract

International commodity agreements (ICAs) fit uneasily in a world in which markets are becoming globalized and increasingly competitive. Development policy - both as preached by international agencies and as practiced by typically democratically elected and nonsocialist governments in the major producing countries - emphasizes productive efficiency, product quality, and effective marketing. This is a long way from the ideology that gave central place to supply restrictions operating through central marketing boards and quota allocations. In today's less centralized, more competitive world, the winners and losers from commodity stabilization are more evenly distributed across producing and consuming countries. Commodity policy is no longer a matter of redistribution from consumers to producers. This institutional change has been reinforced by the widespread belief - evidenced, for example, by the collapse of the international tin and coffee agreements - that commodity market stabilization through international agreements cannot succeed. In earlier decades, the belief that stabilization could and would improve the position of commodity producers provided the impetus for resolving some of the problems that intervention threw up. Since the collapse of the tin market in 1985, the belief that commodity market stabilization cannot work has undermined producers'willingness to try to resolve difficulties within existing ICAs and has reinforced the suspicion of consumer governments that these agreements were in no one's interests. In the current climate, encouraging competitive markets, state interventions are seen as requiring clear justification in terms of market failure. The existence of active futures markets in all of the industries that have commodity agreements makes justification along these lines problematic. But the"commodity problem"has not disappeared, and producers may look for other mechanisms to raise prices from often very low levels in industries experiencing excess capacity. Developed country governments may be forced to decide whether they prefer to see markets controlled by producer cartels (where they will lack representation) or under the auspices of international commodity agreements.

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Paper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 1545.

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Date of creation: 30 Nov 1995
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Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:1545

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Keywords: Markets and Market Access; Payment Systems&Infrastructure; Environmental Economics&Policies; Economic Theory&Research; Commodities; Access to Markets; Environmental Economics&Policies; Crops&Crop Management Systems; Economic Theory&Research; Markets and Market Access;

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Deaton, Angus & Laroque, Guy, 1992. "On the Behaviour of Commodity Prices," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 59(1), pages 1-23, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Miranda, Mario J & Helmberger, Peter G, 1988. "The Effects of Commodity Price Stabilization Programs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(1), pages 46-58, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Townsend, Robert M., 1977. "The eventual failure of price fixing schemes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 190-199, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Bohman, Mary & Jarvis, Lovell, 1990. "The International Coffee Agreement: Economics of the Nonmember Market," European Review of Agricultural Economics, Oxford University Press for the Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 17(1), pages 99-118.
  5. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521326162 is not listed on IDEAS
  6. Arrow, Kenneth J & Lind, Robert C, 1970. "Uncertainty and the Evaluation of Public Investment Decisions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 60(3), pages 364-78, June.
  7. Slade, Margaret E, 1991. "Market Structure, Marketing Method, and Price Instability," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 106(4), pages 1309-40, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Danthine, Jean-Pierre, 1978. "Information, futures prices, and stabilizing speculation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 17(1), pages 79-98, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Palm, F.C. & Vogelvang, E., 1989. "The effectiveness of the international coffee agreement : a simulation study using a quarterly model of the world coffee market," Serie Research Memoranda 0061, VU University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Econometrics. [Downloadable!]
  10. Haskel, Jonathan, 1995. "Cartels, Contracts and Centralization: The Transition to Futures Trading for Primary Commodities," CEPR Discussion Papers 1193, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Anderson, Ronald W & Gilbert, Christopher L, 1988. "Commodity Agreements and Commodity Markets: Lessons from Tin," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 98(389), pages 1-15, March.
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Ronchi, Loraine, 2006. "Fairtrade and market failures in agricultural commodity markets," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4011, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
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