This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Tentative first steps : an assessment of the Uruguay Round agreement on services

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Hoekman, Bernard

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

A major result of the Uruguay Round was the creation of a General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). The GATS greatly extends coverage of the multilateral trading system, establishing rules and disciplines on policies affecting access to service markets. In this paper, the author asks: what does the GATS do to bind policies? And has it established a mechanism likely to induce significant liberalization through future rounds of negotiations? The GATS consists of two elements: 1) a set of general concepts, principles, and rules that apply across the board to measures affecting trade in services; and 2) specific commitments on national treatment and market access. These apply only to service activities listed in a member's schedule - reflecting the agreement's"positive-list"approach to determining coverage - and only to the extent that sector-specific or cross-sectoral qualifications or conditions are not maintained. The impact of the GATS depends largely on the specific commitments made by members, and sectoral coverage is far from universal. High-income countries scheduled about half of their service sectors; developing countries as a group (including Eastern European countries in transition) scheduled only 11 percent. And the sectors scheduled often continue to be subject to measures that violate national treatment or limit market access. High-income countries scheduled only 28 percent of the universe of services without exceptions to national treatment or market access obligations. For developing countries, that figure is only 6.5 percent. Much remains to be done. The GAT's weaknesses include: 1) a lack of transparency. No information is generated on sectors, subsectors, and activities in which no commitments are scheduled - most often the sensitive areas where restrictions and discriminatory practices abound; 2) the sector-specificity of liberalization commitments. Negotiations were driven by the concerns of major players of each industry, leading to an emphasis on"absolute"sectoral reciprocity, limiting the scope for incremental liberalization, tradeoffs across issues, and an economywide perspective; and 3) the limited number of generic rules. Rather than lock in liberal situations that exist, the GATS allows for the future imposition of restrictions (creating"negotiating chips"). To foster nondiscriminatory liberalization, sectoral agreeements should be firmly imbedded in a framework of general rules and disciplines. Many of the framework's general principles apply only if specific commitments have been made. Therefore they are not general. Proposals for improving the GATS should probably build on the existing structure as mush as possible. Possibilities include the following: 1) ultimately, apply the same rules to goods and services. Eliminate the artificial distinction between the two; 2) adopt a negative-list approach to scheduling commitments for the sake of transparency; 3) eliminate overlap between national treatment and market access; 4) develop generic,"horizontal"disciplines for the different modes of supply through which service markets may be contested; 5) explore the possibility of converting quota-like market access restrictions to price-based equivalent measures, thus ensuring that the most-favored-nation and national treatment principles are satisfied; 6) make framework disciplines general by eliminating all instances in which rules are conditional on the scheduling of specific commitments; and 7) agree to a formula-based approach for liberalizing and expanding the GAT's sectoral coverage in future negotiations.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1995/05/01/000009265_3961019105408/Rendered/PDF/multi_page.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 1455.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 31 May 1995
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:1455

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20433
Email:
Web page: http://www.worldbank.org/
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Roula I. Yazigi).

Related research
Keywords: Economic Theory&Research; Environmental Economics&Policies; Payment Systems&Infrastructure; Decentralization; Health Economics&Finance; Health Economics&Finance; Economic Theory&Research; Trade and Services; TF054105-DONOR FUNDED OPERATION ADMINISTRATION FEE INCOME AND EXPENSE ACCOUNT; ICT Policy and Strategies;

Other versions of this item:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Hoekman, Bernard & Mavroidis, Petros C, 1995. "The WTO's Agreement on Government Procurement: Expanding Disciplines, Declining Membership?," CEPR Discussion Papers 1112, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Bhagwati, Jagdish N, 1987. "Trade in Services and the Multilateral Trade Negotiations," World Bank Economic Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 1(4), pages 549-69, September.
  3. Deardoff, A.V. & Brown, D.K. & Stern, R.M. & Fox, A.K., 1995. "Computational Analysis of Goods and Services Liberalization in the Uruguay Round," Working Papers 379, Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan.
  4. Hindley, Brian, 1988. "Service Sector Protection: Considerations for Developing Countries," World Bank Economic Review, Oxford University Press, vol. 2(2), pages 205-24, May.
  5. Maskus, Keith E & Konan, Denise Eby, 1997. "Trade Liberalization in Egypt," Review of Development Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 1(3), pages 275-93, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Bernard M. Hoekman & Robert M. Stern, 1991. "Evolving Patterns of Trade and Investment in Services," NBER Chapters, in: International Economic Transactions: Issues in Measurement and Empirical Research, pages 237-290 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!]
  7. Sapir, André, 1991. "The Structure of Services in Europe: A Conceptual Framework," CEPR Discussion Papers 498, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. John Roberts, 2000. "Issues in the liberalization of trade in services," Journal of International Development, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 12(2), pages 257-264.
  2. Rashmi Banga, 2005. "Trade and foreign direct investment in services: A review," Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations, New Delhi Working Papers 154, Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations, New Delhi, India. [Downloadable!]
  3. Konan, Denise Eby & Maskus, Keith E., 2003. "Quantifying the impact of services liberalization in a developing country," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3193, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Keith Walsh, 2006. "Trade in Services: Does Gravity Hold? A Gravity Model Approach to Estimating Barriers to Services Trade," The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series iiisdp183, IIIS. [Downloadable!]
  5. Rajesh Chadha & Drusilla K. Brown & Alan V. Deardorff & Robert M. Stern, 2000. "Computational Analysis of the Impact on India of the Uruguay Round and the Forthcoming WTO Trade Negotiations," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 312, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Stephenson, Sherry M., 1999. "Approaches to liberalizing services," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2107, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  7. Zafar Mahmood, 1998. "WTO and Pakistan: Opportunities and Policy Challenges," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 37(4), pages 687-701. [Downloadable!]
  8. Hoekman, Bernard, 1995. "The World Trade Organization, the European Union, and the Arab World : trade policy priorities and pitfalls," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1513, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  9. Harms, Philipp & Mattoo, Aaditya & Schuknecht, Ludger, 2003. "Explaining liberalization commitments in financial services trade," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2999, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? You can use convenient plug-ins to search directly IDEAS from your browser.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-26.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.