Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Ownership and corporate control in Poland : why state firms defied the odds

Contents:

Author Info

  • Pinto, Brian
  • van Wijnbergen, Sweder

Abstract

Survey results in Poland indicate that hard budgets and import comeption can spur state firms to adjust even when privatization lags behind. As they examine the underpinning of Polish reform, the authors address the key question of why managers instigated such adjustment. They examine how corporate ownership and control influence the behavior of state firms, as illuminated by the following survey findings and conclusions: (a) Contrary to expectations, state firms took painful adjustment measures. Enterprise managers firmly believed that privatization was coming. This belief led them to manage better, not worse; a private sector based economy means a market for managers and a premium on skilled management. (b) The excess wage tax (the much criticized"Popiwek"scheme) did restrain wage-setting behavior, judging from the wage-setting equations presented by the authors. (c) Essential to the good performance of state industries is an end to open-ended subsidies. Subsidies, rather than helping firms adjust, give them incentives to continue their past behavior and destroy any mechanism of control other claim-holders might have. (d) Commercial banks, the Polish experience shows, can be made to exercise governance over state firms. Without effective takeover mechanisms, withholding funds is their most powerful instrument. That instrument is made powerless if firms, pressured to adjust by banks, can turn to the government themselves. Banks themselves started to respond appropriately- and to play a powerful role in discipline enterprises - only after their own governance and control/incentive mechanisms had been reformed as part of the banking reforms of the fourth quarter of 1991.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/1994/06/01/000009265_3970716141025/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 1308.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 30 Jun 1994
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:1308

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20433
Phone: (202) 477-1234
Email:
Web page: http://www.worldbank.org/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Economic Theory&Research; Municipal Financial Management; Environmental Economics&Policies; Public Sector Economics&Finance; Banks&Banking Reform;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Roland, Gerard & Sekkat, Khalid, 2000. "Managerial career concerns, privatization and restructuring in transition economies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(10), pages 1857-1872, December.
  2. Gerald A. McDermott, 2004. "The Politics of Institutional Learning and Creation: Bank Crises and Supervision in East Central Europe," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series wp726, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
  3. Brown, J David & Earle, John S, 2001. "Privatization, Competition and Reform Strategies: Theory and Evidence from Russian Enterprise Panel Data," CEPR Discussion Papers 2758, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Budina, Nina & Garretsen, Harry & de Jong, Elke, 2000. "Liquidity constraints and investment in transition economies - the case of Bulgaria," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2278, The World Bank.
  5. Ann P. Bartel and Ann E. Harrison & Ann P. Bartel and Ann E. Harrison, 1999. "Ownership Versus Environment: Why are Public Sector Firms Inefficient?," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 257, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
  6. Ann P. Bartel & Ann E. Harrison, 2005. "Ownership Versus Environment: Disentangling the Sources of Public-Sector Inefficiency," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 87(1), pages 135-147, February.
  7. Q. Fan & U. Lee & M.E. Schaffer, 1996. "Firms, Banks and Credit in Russia," CERT Discussion Papers 9609, Centre for Economic Reform and Transformation, Heriot Watt University.
  8. Jacek Kochanowicz & Piotr Kozarzewski & Richard Woodward, 2005. "Understanding Reform: The Case of Poland," CASE Network Reports 0059, CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research.
  9. Claessens, Stijn & Djankov, Simeon, 1998. "Politicians and firms in seven central and eastern European countries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1954, The World Bank.
  10. Yurii Perevalov & Ilya Gimadii & Vladimir Dobrodei, 2000. "Does Privatisation Improve Performance of Industrial Enterprises? Empirical Evidence from Russia," Post-Communist Economies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 12(3), pages 337-363.
  11. Frydman, Roman & Gray, Cheryl W. & Hessel, Marek & Rapaczynski, Andrzej, 1997. "Private ownership and corporate performance : some lessons from transition economies," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1830, The World Bank.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:1308. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Roula I. Yazigi).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.