In this paper I demonstrate the existence an initial incomplete contract that can subsequently be renegociated to the set of first best allocations in a fairly geneal principal-agent model when the state space is continuous.
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Paper provided by University of Waterloo, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
9614.
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