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Evolutionary Stability of Kantian Optimization

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  • Philip A. Curry

    (Department of Economics, University of Waterloo)

  • John E. Roemer

    (Departments of Political Science and Economics, Yale University)

Abstract

In Nash equilibrium, agents are autarchic in their optimization protocol, whereas in Kantian equilibrium, they optimize in an interdependent way. Typically, researchers into the evolution of homo economicus treat preferences as being determined by selective adaptation, but hold fixed the optimization protocol as autarchic. Here, we ask whether natural selection might choose the optimizing protocol to be either autarchic or interdependent. That is, will Kantian players, for whom the stable concept is Kantian equilibrium drive Nash players (for whom the stable concept is Nash equilibrium) to extinction, or otherwise? The answer depends upon whether players can signal their type to others.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Waterloo, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 1206.

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Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2012
Date of revision: Apr 2012
Handle: RePEc:wat:wpaper:1206

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  1. Nick Netzer, 2009. "Evolution of Time Preferences and Attitudes toward Risk," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(3), pages 937-55, June.
  2. Curry, Philip A., 2001. "Decision Making under Uncertainty and the Evolution of Interdependent Preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(2), pages 357-369, June.
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