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Buying spatially-coordinated ecosystem services and biodiversity conservation on forest land: an experiment on the role of auction format and communication

Author

Listed:
  • Anna Bartczak

    (Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw; Warsaw Ecological Economics Center)

  • Michał Krawczyk

    (Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw; Warsaw Ecological Economics Center)

  • Nick Hanley

    (Department of Geography and Sustainable Development, University of St Andrews)

  • Anne Stenger

    (INRA, Laboratoire d'Économie Forestière)

Abstract

Procurement auctions are one of several policy tools available to incentivise the provision of ecosystem services and biodiversity conservation. Successful biodiversity conservation often requires a landscape-scale approach and the spatial coordination of participation, for example in the creation of wildlife corridors. In this paper, we use a laboratory experiment to explore two features of procurement auctions in a forest landscape—the pricing mechanism (uniform vs. discriminatory) and availability of communication (chat) between potential sellers. We modify the experimental design developed by Reeson et al. (2011) by introducing uncertainty (and hence heterogeneity) in the production value of forest sites as well as an automated, endogenous stopping rule. We find that discriminatory pricing yields to greater environmental benefits per government dollar spent, chiefly due to better coordination between owners of adjacent plots. Chat also facilitates such coordination but also seems to encourage collusion in sustaining high prices for the most environmentally attractive plots. These two effects offset each other, making chat neutral from the viewpoint of maximizing environmental effect per dollar spent.

Suggested Citation

  • Anna Bartczak & Michał Krawczyk & Nick Hanley & Anne Stenger, 2014. "Buying spatially-coordinated ecosystem services and biodiversity conservation on forest land: an experiment on the role of auction format and communication," Working Papers 2014-19, Faculty of Economic Sciences, University of Warsaw.
    • Handle: RePEc:war:wpaper:2014-19
    as

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    File URL: http://www.wne.uw.edu.pl/inf/wyd/WP/WNE_WP136.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ajayi, Oluyede C. & Jack, B. Kelsey & Leimona, Beria, 2012. "Auction Design for the Private Provision of Public Goods in Developing Countries: Lessons from Payments for Environmental Services in Malawi and Indonesia," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 40(6), pages 1213-1223.
    2. Parkhurst, Gregory M. & Shogren, Jason F. & Bastian, Chris & Kivi, Paul & Donner, Jennifer & Smith, Rodney B. W., 2002. "Agglomeration bonus: an incentive mechanism to reunite fragmented habitat for biodiversity conservation," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 305-328, May.
    3. Nick Hanley & Simanti Banerjee & Gareth D. Lennox & Paul R. Armsworth, 2012. "How should we incentivize private landowners to ‘produce’ more biodiversity?," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 28(1), pages 93-113, Spring.
    4. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    conservation auctions; spatial coordination; chat in experiments; discriminatory and uniform auctions; biodiversity conservation; provision of ecosystem services;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • Q23 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Forestry
    • Q57 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Ecological Economics
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

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