The effect of unemployment insurance sanctions on the transition rate from unemployment to employment
AbstractThis paper analyzes the effect of unemployment insurance sanctions on the transition rate from unemployment to employment. Sanctions are punitive benefits reductions that are supposed to make recipients comply with certain minimum requirements concerning search behavior. We use a unique set of administrative micro data covering the whole population of individuals who started collecting unemployment insurance in the Netherlands in 1992. To deal with the selectivity of the occurrence of a sanction we simultaneously model the process by which unemployed get a sanction and the process by which they find jobs. We exploit the fact that some respondents experience multiple spells.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by VU University Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Econometrics in its series Serie Research Memoranda with number 0038.
Date of creation: 1996
Date of revision:
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
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