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Cycles with Undistinguished Actions and Extended Rock-Paper-Scissors Games

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  • Eric Bahel
  • Hans Haller

Abstract

The present paper examines zero-sum games that are based on a cyclic preference relation defined over anonymous actions. For each of these games, the set of Nash equilibria is characterized. When the number of actions is odd, a unique Nash equilibrium is always obtained. On the other hand, in the case of an even number of actions, every such game exhibits an infinite number of Nash equilibria. As a special case, a proof of the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium for the Rock-Paper-Scissors game obtains.

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File URL: ftp://repec.econ.vt.edu/Papers/Bahel/GRPS-6.pdf
File Function: First version, 2012
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number e07-34.

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Length: 48 pages
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:vpi:wpaper:e07-34

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Keywords: cycle; Nash equilibrium; minimax theorem.;

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  1. Anne van den Nouweland, 2007. "Rock-paper-scissors a new and elegant proof," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(43), pages 1-6.
  2. Bahel, Eric, 2012. "Rock–paper–scissors and cycle-based games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 115(3), pages 401-403.
  3. Martin Meier & Burkhard Schipper, 2012. "Bayesian Games with Unawareness and Unawareness Perfection," Working Papers 129, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  4. A. van den Nouweland, 2007. "Rock-Paper-Scissors; A New and Elegant Proof," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 1003, The University of Melbourne.
  5. Peter Duersch & Jörg Oechssler & Burkhard Schipper, 2012. "Pure strategy equilibria in symmetric two-player zero-sum games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 41(3), pages 553-564, August.
  6. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2007:i:43:p:1-6 is not listed on IDEAS
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