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Rock-Paper-Scissors and Cycle-Based Games

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  • Eric Bahel

Abstract

The present work characterizes the unique Nash equilibrium for games that are based on a cyclic preference relation. In the Nash equilibrium of these games, each player randomizes between three specific actions. In particular, an alternative way of deriving the unique Nash equilibrium of the Rock-Paper-Scissors game is proposed.

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File URL: ftp://repec.econ.vt.edu/Papers/Bahel/RPS.pdf
File Function: First version, 2010
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number e07-31.

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Length: 8 pages
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:vpi:wpaper:e07-31

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Keywords: cycle; Nash equilibrium; prudent strategy;

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References

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  1. Anne van den Nouweland, 2007. "Rock-paper-scissors a new and elegant proof," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(43), pages 1-6.
  2. A. van den Nouweland, 2007. "Rock-Paper-Scissors; A New and Elegant Proof," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series, The University of Melbourne 1003, The University of Melbourne.
  3. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2007:i:43:p:1-6 is not listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
  1. Eric Bahel & Christian Trudeau, 2012. "Consistency Requirements and Pattern Methods in Cost Sharing Problems with Technological Cooperation," Working Papers, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Department of Economics e07-34, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Department of Economics.
  2. Bahel, Eric & Haller, Hans, 2013. "Cycles with undistinguished actions and extended Rock–Paper–Scissors games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 120(3), pages 588-591.

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