An n-country model of strategic emissions abatement: feedback strategies and cooperation
AbstractThe present paper proposes a dynamic framework for the analysis of emissions abatement by different countries. Unlike many related works, it emphasizes the non-cooperative aspects of this issue. We derive the feedback Nash equilibrium as well as the cooperative emissions paths. Under the cooperative scenario, pollution is always lower: the international agency imposes lower emissions to the countries in early periods. Surprisingly enough, emissions might be higher in very distant periods under the cooperative scenario. A transfer scheme allowing to achieve global effciency is proposed.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number e07-25.
Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
emissions; strategic abatement; pollution stock; feedback (closed-loop) Nash equilibrium; cooperation; transfers.;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-01-03 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENE-2011-01-03 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2011-01-03 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2011-01-03 (Game Theory)
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