AbstractIn a model of strategic network formation, the endogenously formed network is built around a pre-existing network. We envisage that the pre-existing or core network is publicly provided. Strategic network formation is decentralized: Players act in their private interest and bear the costs when adding links to the pre-existing network. We study how the pre-existing network affects existence of Nash equilibria and eï¬ƒciency of Nash equilibrium outcomes.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number e07-22.
Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: 2010
Date of revision:
Network formation; Network extension; Network infrastructure; Strategic games; Eï¬ƒciency; Stability;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2010-10-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-CSE-2010-10-23 (Economics of Strategic Management)
- NEP-GTH-2010-10-23 (Game Theory)
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