Jelena Zarkovic () (Faculty of Economics, University of Belgrade, Serbia)
Abstract
The institution of property rights is increasingly recognized as an essential building block of an economically prosperous society. The question that remains unsolved, however, is how do we develop effective property rights institutions? The literature dealing with the development of property rights tends to be, in general, an optimistic one since there is a tendency to view the design of property rights institutions as maximizing decisions to economize on transaction costs and to facilitate new economic activities. On the other hand, since property rights define the distribution of wealth and political power in a society, changes in property rights structures are likely to be influenced by more than pure efficiency considerations. Therefore, in order to achieve a balanced analysis of the evolution of property rights institutions, the model of endogenous property rights creation should be modified. We did that by introducing the neoinstitutional theory of the state in the model.
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Faculty of economics, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
200633.
Length: 15 pages Date of creation: 2006 Date of revision:
Sep 2006 Publication status: Published in Panoeconomicus, September 2006, pages 283-298 Handle: RePEc:voj:wpaper:200633
Find related papers by JEL classification: P26 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Systems and Transition Economies - - - Political Economy D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior