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The Anglo-Saxon versus the Continental European Corporate Governance Model: Empirical Evidence of Board Composition in Belgium

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Author Info
Hubert Ooghe ()
Veerle De Vuyst (Vlerick Leuven Gent Management School)

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Abstract

In this paper, two corporate governance models have been compared - the Anglo-Saxon and the Continental European models. These corporate governance models differ strongly, and the differences are mainly due to differences in the business context. The problems arising from separation of ownership from control will thus have to be solved through different mechanisms. One important mechanism is the board of directors. The board composition of 122 companies has been analyzed in a Belgian empirical study. From the tests, we found a significant positive relationship between the number of directors in the board and a range of other factors: the size of the company; its nationality; whether the company is listed or not; and the sector in which the company is operating. Only shareholder structure has no effect on the size of the board. The second variable affecting the composition of the board is the percentage of external directors. We found that the number of external directors differs significantly between companies with a different nationality and between companies that are listed or not. The size, the shareholder structure and the sector were not related to the percentage of external directors in a company. Keywords: corporate governance, board composition

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Paper provided by Vlerick Leuven Gent Management School in its series Vlerick Leuven Gent Management School Working Paper Series with number 2001-6.

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Length: 42 pages
Date of creation: 06 Nov 2001
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Handle: RePEc:vlg:vlgwps:2001-6

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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Del Brio, Esther B. & Maia-Ramires, Elida, 2005. "Corporate Governance Mechanisms and Their Impact on Managerial Value," Documentos de Trabajo "Nuevas Tendencias en Dirección de Empresas". Working Papers "New Trends on Business Administration". 2005-09, Interuniversitary Doctorate Program "New Trends on Business Administration", Universities of Valladolid, Burgos and Salamanca (Spain). Programa de Doctorado Interuniversitario "Nuevas Tendencias en Di.
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