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  • Steven Stern

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Abstract

This paper examines a generalized rivalry problem in the labour market. It employs a simple labour supply model as a framework to analyse labour markets characterized by search with competition among searchers. First, the labour market process for new hires is described. The searching worker's opportunities are determined by the market parameter which is the probability that an application will not generate a job offer. The model is closed by determining the value of the market parameter given the search strategy that each worker individually follows. There exists a non-trivial eqUilibrium in steady state. At this equilibrium a social planner can improve each worker's welfare by inducing each worker to search less intensively.

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File URL: http://www.virginia.edu/economics/RePEc/vir/virpap/papers/virpap398.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Virginia, Department of Economics in its series Virginia Economics Online Papers with number 398.

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Length: 15 pages
Date of creation: 1990
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:vir:virpap:398

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Web page: http://www.virginia.edu/economics/home.html

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Keywords: search;

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  1. Pissarides, Christopher A, 1985. "Taxes, Subsidies, and Equilibrium Unemployment," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(1), pages 121-33, January.
  2. Wilde, Louis L., 1977. "Labor market equilibrium under nonsequential search," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 373-393, December.
  3. Diamond, Peter A, 1981. "Mobility Costs, Frictional Unemployment, and Efficiency," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 798-812, August.
  4. Diamond, Peter A, 1982. "Wage Determination and Efficiency in Search Equilibrium," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 49(2), pages 217-27, April.
  5. John M. Barron & Otis W. Gilley, 1979. "The effect of unemployment insurance on the search process," Industrial and Labor Relations Review, ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 32(3), pages 363-366, April.
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