Informal influence in the Inter-American Development Bank
AbstractThis paper investigates U.S. informal influence in the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) by testing whether IDB loans disburse faster when the borrowing country is geopolitically or economically important to the U.S. The methodology is similar to that in earlier work on the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank and relies on the governance structure in which formal donor influence ends with loan approval, i.e., prior to loan disbursement. In contrast to findings for the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, we do not uncover convincing evidence of consistent U.S. informal influence in the Inter-American Development Bank.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Villanova School of Business Department of Economics and Statistics in its series Villanova School of Business Department of Economics and Statistics Working Paper Series with number 22.
Date of creation: Aug 2012
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Web page: http://www.villanova.edu/business/facultyareas/economics/
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Donor Influence; Inter-American Development Bank; United States; UN voting;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- F35 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Aid
- F53 - International Economics - - International Relations and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
- F55 - International Economics - - International Relations and International Political Economy - - - International Institutional Arrangements
- O19 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations
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- Hernandez, Diego, 2013. "Does Inclusion Guarantee Institutional Autonomy? The Case of the Inter-American Development Bank," Working Papers 0541, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
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