Environmental fiscal competition under productdifferenciation and endogeous firm location
AbstractThe purpose of this paper is to conduct a positive analysis of the effect of the pollution taxation on the cross-country location of firms, on the volume of production and on welfare. In particular, we focus on the environmental problem arising when the production generates strictly local pollution externalities. In this case, although there is no regional spillover of pollution, the environmental problem still affects the interregional or international policy since its national regulation determines the location of production. Thus, we turn our attention to the strategy behavior of the governments, which can compete in terms of their environmental policies in order to maximize the national welfare. Furthermore, we also analyze whether a supranational coordinating the environmental policy of its members can drive welfare up comparing to a situation with tax competition among governments. We show that the results depend crucially on the degree of differentiation between the products supplied by each firm.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universidade de Vigo, Departamento de Economía Aplicada in its series Working Papers with number 0311.
Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2003
Date of revision:
Environmental policy; Tax Competition; Plant Location; Product differentiation;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
- Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation
- R3 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Real Estate Markets, Production Analysis, and Firm Location
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- James R. Markusen & Edward R. Morey & Nancy Olewiler, 1991.
"Environmental Policy When Market Structure and Plant Locations are Endo-genous,"
NBER Working Papers
3671, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Markusen James R. & Morey Edward R. & Olewiler Nancy D., 1993. "Environmental Policy when Market Structure and Plant Locations Are Endogenous," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 69-86, January.
- Forster, Bruce A., 1988. "Spatial economic theory of pollution control: Reflections on a paradox," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 470-474, December.
- Anderson, Simon P & Neven, Damien J, 1991. "Cournot Competition Yields Spatial Agglomeration," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 32(4), pages 793-808, November.
- Markusen, James R. & Morey, Edward R. & Olewiler, Nancy, 1995. "Competition in regional environmental policies when plant locations are endogenous," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 55-77, January.
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