A Note on the Non-existence of a Rationing Equilibrium in the Besanko-Thakor-Model
AbstractIt is shown that in a credit market with two types of borrowers, distinguished only through their not commonly known probability of default, and with a perfectly elastic supply of deposits, a pair of contracts with random rationing of less risky loan applicants cannot be a Nash-equilibrium. Copyright 1993 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Vienna, Department of Economics in its series Vienna Economics Papers with number vie9001.
Date of creation: Jan 1990
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Publication status: published in International Economic Review
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Web page: http://www.univie.ac.at/vwl
Other versions of this item:
- Clemenz, Gerhard, 1993. "A Note on the Nonexistence of a Rationing Equilibrium in the Besanko-Thakor Model," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 34(3), pages 727-37, August.
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- Rajalaxmi Kamath, 2006. "Public inputs and the credit market," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 13(6), pages 733-753, November.
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