Immigration and voting on the size and the composition of public spending
AbstractThis paper develops a model to analyze the effects of immigration by skill on the outcome of a majority vote among natives on both the size as well as the composition of public spending. Public spending can be of two types, spending on rival goods (transfers) and on non-rival goods (public goods). I find that relative preferences for the different types of public spending are crucial for the effects of immigration. In particular, immigrants of either skill can increase (decrease) the size of total public spending, if natives have a relative preference for spendingon public goods (spending on transfers). I provide some illustration of potential relative spending preferences in OECD countries using panel data for 1980 - 2010.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Vienna, Department of Economics in its series Vienna Economics Papers with number 1101.
Date of creation: Oct 2010
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Web page: http://www.univie.ac.at/vwl
Other versions of this item:
- Karin Mayr, 2011. "Immigration and voting on the size and the composition of public spending," Norface Discussion Paper Series 2011001, Norface Research Programme on Migration, Department of Economics, University College London.
- F2 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business
- H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
- H5 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-01-23 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2011-01-23 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-MIG-2011-01-23 (Economics of Human Migration)
- NEP-PBE-2011-01-23 (Public Economics)
- NEP-POL-2011-01-23 (Positive Political Economics)
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