We consider situations in which a principal tries to induce an agent to spend e®ort on accumulating a state variable that a®ects the well-being of both parties. The only incentive mechanism that the principal can use is a state-dependent transfer of her own utility to the agent. Formally, the model is a Stackelberg di®erential game in which the players use feedback strategies. Whereas in general Stackelberg di®erential games with feedback strategy spaces the leader's optimization problem has non-standard features that make it extremely hard to solve, in the present case this problem can be rewritten as a standard optimal control problem. Two examples are used to illustrate our approach.
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Paper provided by University of Vienna, Department of Economics in its series Vienna Economics Papers with number
0905.
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