This article adds technology choice to a free-entry Cournot model with linear demand and constant marginal costs. Firms can choose from a discrete set of technologies. This simple framework yields non-existence of equilibrium, existence of multiple equilibria and equilibria in which ex-ante indentical firms choose different technoligies as possible outcomes. I provide a full characterization of the parameter sets for which these outcomes arise. The (non)-existence problem disappears if vertical market size is large. Non-existence is largely a ´small number´phenemenon. Asymetric equilibria emerge either because of indivisibilities or due to similarity of different technologies in terms of the average costs realized.
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Paper provided by University of Vienna, Department of Economics in its series Vienna Economics Papers with number
0214.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Jeffrey R. Campbell & Hugo A. Hopenhayn, 2002.
"Market Size Matters,"
NBER Working Papers
9113, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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