Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Win Stay, Lose Shift Or Imitation – Only The Choice Of Peers Counts


Author Info

  • Martin Posch



Win Stay, Lose Shift as well as imitation strategies for iterated games rely on an aspiration level. With both learning rules a move is repeated unless the pay-off fell short of the aspiration level. I investigate social adaptation mechanisms for the aspiration level and their impact on the efficiency of learning in a large population of agents that repeatedly play one round of a symmetric 2x2 game against randomly chosen opponents. It turns out that if the aspiration level is given by the last payoff of the current opponent the population receives the maximal symmetric payoff of the game in the long run. If the aspiration level is determined by independently chosen agents the outcome is related to the evolutionarly stable strategies. This holds for win stay, lose shift as well as for imitation based learning. These results suggest that the choice of peers can be crucial for the efficiency of learning.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL:
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Vienna, Department of Economics in its series Vienna Economics Papers with number 0109.

as in new window
Date of creation: Jul 2001
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:vie:viennp:0109

Contact details of provider:
Web page:

Related research


Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:


No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.



This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.


Access and download statistics


When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:vie:viennp:0109. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Paper Administrator).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.