Learning by Imitation when Playing the Field

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Learning by Imitation when Playing the Field

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Ana B. Ania ()

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Ana B. Ania

Abstract

We study the properties of learning rules based on imitation in the context of n-player games played among agents within the same population. We find that there are no (nontrivial) rules that increase (average) expected payoffs at each possible state, and for any possible game. The results highlight the complexity of learning by imitation of successful behavior displayed by conspecifics in the presence of strategic considerations within the same population.

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Paper provided by University of Vienna, Department of Economics in its series Vienna Economics Papers with number 0005.

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Date of creation: Sep 2000
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Handle: RePEc:vie:viennp:0005

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Schlag, Karl H., 1999. "Which one should I imitate?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 493-522, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Alos-Ferrer, Carlos & Ania, Ana B. & Schenk-Hoppe, Klaus Reiner, 2000. "An Evolutionary Model of Bertrand Oligopoly," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 1-19, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Ana B. Ania & Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Klaus R. Schenk-Hoppé, 1998. "- An Evolutionary Model Of Bertrand Oligopoly," Working Papers. Serie AD 1998-14, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie). [Downloadable!]
- Alos-Ferrer, C. & Ania, A.B. & Schenk-Hoppe, K.R., 1998. "An Evolutionary Model of Bertrand Oligopoly," Papers 98-14, Valencia - Instituto de Investigaciones Economicas.
Josef Hofbauer & Karl H. Schlag, 2000. "Sophisticated imitation in cyclic games," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 10(5), pages 523-543. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Hofbauer, Josef, and Karl H. Schlag, . "Sophisticated Imitation in Cyclic Games," Discussion Paper Serie B 427, University of Bonn, Germany, revised Mar 1998. [Downloadable!]
Schlag, Karl H., 1998. "Why Imitate, and If So, How?, : A Boundedly Rational Approach to Multi-armed Bandits," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 130-156, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Karl H. Schlag, 1995. "Why Imitate, and if so, How? A Bounded Rational Approach to Multi-Armed Bandits," Discussion Paper Serie B 361, University of Bonn, Germany, revised Mar 1996. [Downloadable!]
- Schlag, Karl H., 1994. "Why Imitate, and if so, How? Exploring a Model of Social Evolution," Discussion Paper Serie B 296, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
Huck, Steffen & Normann, Hans-Theo & Oechssler, Jorg, 1999. "Learning in Cournot Oligopoly--An Experiment," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(454), pages C80-95, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Steffen Huck & Hans-Theo Normann & Joerg Oechssler, 1997. "Learning in Cournot Oligopoly - An Experiment," Game Theory and Information 9707009, EconWPA, revised 22 Jul 1997. [Downloadable!]
Pingle, Mark & Day, Richard H., 1996. "Modes of economizing behavior: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 191-209, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Conlisk, John, 1980. "Costly optimizers versus cheap imitators," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 1(3), pages 275-293, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Adelina Gschwandtner, 2004. "Profit Persistence in the "Very" Long Run: Evidence from Survivors and Exiters," Vienna Economics Papers 0401, University of Vienna, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Carlos Alós-Ferrer & Ana B. Ania, 2003. "The Asset Market Game," Vienna Economics Papers 0320, University of Vienna, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Alos-Ferrer, Carlos & Ania, Ana B., 2005. "The asset market game," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1-2), pages 67-90, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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