AbstractWe analyze a model of repeated franchise bidding for natural monopoly with contestable licensing - a franchisee halds an (exclusive) license to operate a franchise until another rm offers to pay more for it. In a world where quality is observable but not veri able, the simple regulatory scheme we describe combines market-like incentives with regulatory oversight to generate efficient outcomes.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Vienna, Department of Economics in its series Vienna Economics Papers with number 0004.
Date of creation: Jul 2000
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.univie.ac.at/vwl
Other versions of this item:
- Zvika Neeman, 2000. "Contestable Licensing," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1430, Econometric Society.
- D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Monopoly
- D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Rationing; Licensing
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
You can help add them by filling out this form.
reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Paper Administrator).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.