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Contestable Licensing

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Author Info
Zvika Neeman ()
Gerhard O. Orosel ()

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Abstract

We analyze a model of repeated franchise bidding for natural monopoly with contestable licensing - a franchisee halds an (exclusive) license to operate a franchise until another rm offers to pay more for it. In a world where quality is observable but not veri able, the simple regulatory scheme we describe combines market-like incentives with regulatory oversight to generate efficient outcomes.

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File URL: http://homepage.univie.ac.at/Papers.Econ/RePEc/vie/viennp/vie0004.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Vienna, Department of Economics in its series Vienna Economics Papers with number 0004.

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Date of creation: Jul 2000
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Handle: RePEc:vie:viennp:0004

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Web page: http://www.univie.ac.at/vwl

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Monopoly
D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Rationing; Licensing
L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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This page was last updated on 2009-12-2.

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