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Generalized Trust and Sustainable Coexistence between Socially Responsible Firms and Non Profit Organizations

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Author Info
Angelo Antoci () (University of Sassari)
Marcello Galeotti () (University o Firenze)
Paolo Russu () (University of Sassari)
Zarri () (Department of Economics (University of Verona))

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

In this paper, we focus on a specific component of economically rel- evant trust, i.e. on what we call `institutionally produced generalized trust', defined as the amount of widespread trust (which is a public good for the economic system as a whole) endogenously and continuously gen- erated by the interaction of two types of private organizations operating in the economy: for-profit firms and nonprofit organizations. Through an evolutionary model with a trust accumulation equation and two replicator equations (capturing the evolution of economic organizations over time) we show that (1) The fixed point where all the four sub-types of private organizations considered in the model are simultaneously present can be attractive only if `virtuous' for-profits (i.e. socially responsible firms) and `virtuous' nonprofits (i.e. actually trustworthy mission-oriented organiza- tions) generate a negative externality on the other organizations of the same type. (2) The fixed point where the level of trust is very low and no socially responsible firms neither trustworthy organizations are present can be attractive; this social configuration interestingly recalls, to some extent, what some prominent social scientists depict as a trend currently occurring in the United States. (3) A socio-economic scenario where four pure population fixed points are simultaneously attractive exists.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Università di Verona, Dipartimento di Scienze economiche in its series Working Papers with number 22.

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Length: 36
Date of creation: Jul 2005
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Publication status: Published on Journal of Chaos, Solitons and Fractals, 29, 3, 2006, pp. 783-802.
Handle: RePEc:ver:wpaper:22

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Related research
Keywords: Generalized trust; socially responsible firms; nonprofit organizations; evolutionary games;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
L3 - Industrial Organization - - Nonprofit Organizations and Public Enterprise
Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Social Norms and Social Capital; Social Networks Economic Anthropology

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Zak, Paul J & Knack, Stephen, 2001. "Trust and Growth," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(470), pages 295-321, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Bjornerstedt, J. & Weibull, J.W., 1993. "Nash Equilibrium and Evolution by Imitation," DELTA Working Papers 93-23, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
  3. Luigi Guiso & Paola Sapienza & Luigi Zingales, 2004. "The Role of Social Capital in Financial Development," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(3), pages 526-556, June. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Timothy Besley & Maitreesh Ghatak, 2005. "Competition and Incentives with Motivated Agents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(3), pages 616-636, June. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Antoci, Angelo & Sacco, Pier Luigi & Vanin, Paolo, 2007. "Social capital accumulation and the evolution of social participation," The Journal of Socio-Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 128-143, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Sacco, Pier Luigi & Vanin, Paolo & Zamagni, Stefano, 2006. "The Economics of Human Relationships," Handbook on the Economics of Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism, Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Samuel Bowles & Herbert Gintis, 2002. "Social Capital and Community Governance," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(483), pages 419-436, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Angelo Antoci & Pier Sacco & Luca Zarri, 2004. "Coexistence of Strategies and Culturally-Specific Common Knowledge: An Evolutionary Analysis," Journal of Bioeconomics, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 165-194, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Antoci, Angelo & Sacco, Pier Luigi & Zarri, Luca, 2004. "Endogenous Preferences and Private Provision of Public Goods: a Double Critical Mass Model," AICCON Working Papers 2-2004, Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit. [Downloadable!]
  10. Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215, December.
  11. Becchetti, Leonardo & Federico, Giorgio & Solferino, Nazaria, 2005. "The game of social responsibility: pioneers, imitators and social welfare," AICCON Working Papers 15-2005, Associazione Italiana per la Cultura della Cooperazione e del Non Profit. [Downloadable!]
  12. Knack, Stephen & Keefer, Philip, 1997. "Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(4), pages 1251-88, November.
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