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The rise and decline of a great power: Venice 1250-1650

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Author Info
Luciano Pezzolo () (Department of Economics, University Of Venice Ca’ Foscari)

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Abstract

This essay outlines the rise and decline of the most powerful Italian republican state between the middle ages and the early modern period. It moreover seeks to analyze the political, financial, and military means that enabled a state based on a peripheral site and disposing of relatively limited population resources to achieve such a prominent position in Europe. It then examines the causes of its decline, in both relative and absolute terms. The history of Venice in fact offers an excellent case study with which to verify Schumpeter’s thesis for a specific geographical area, that of the Italian peninsula, which has been surprisingly neglected by scholars interested in the origins of the fiscal state.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2006_27.

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Length: 31 pages
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ven:wpaper:2006_27

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Postal: Cannaregio, S. Giobbe no 873 , 30121 Venezia
Phone: 2574183
Fax: 2574176
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Web page: http://www.dse.unive.it
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Related research
Keywords: war; taxation; military power; state formation;

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Avner Greif, 1997. "Self-enforcing Political System and Economic Growth: Late Medieval Genoa," Working Papers 97037, Stanford University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Arthur J. Rolnick & Francois R. Velde & Warren E. Weber, 1997. "The debasement puzzle: an essay on medieval monetary history," Quarterly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, issue Fall, pages 8-20. [Downloadable!]
  3. Rolnick, Arthur J. & Velde, Fran?ois R. & Weber, Warren E., 1996. "The Debasement Puzzle: An Essay on Medieval Monetary History," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(04), pages 789-808, December. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-11-25.

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