Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

US, China and the economics of climate negotiations

Contents:

Author Info

  • Carlo Carraro

    ()
    (Department of Economics, University Of Venice Ca’ Foscari)

  • Barbara Buchner

    (Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei)

Abstract

Despite the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol, the US decision not to comply with its Kyoto commitments seems to drastically undermine the effectiveness of the Protocol in controlling GHG emissions. Therefore, it is important to explore whether there are economic incentives that might help the US to modify its current decision and move to a more environmentally effective climate policy. For example, can an increased participation of developing countries induce the US to effectively participate in the effort to reduce GHG emissions? Is a single emission trading market the appropriate policy framework to increase the signatories of the Kyoto Protocol? This paper addresses the above questions by analysing whether the participation of China in the cooperative effort to control GHG emissions can provide adequate incentives for the US to re-join the Kyoto process and eventually ratify the Kyoto Protocol. This paper analyses three different climate regimes in which China could be involved and assesses the economic incentives for the major world countries and regions to participate in these three regimes. The main conclusion is that the participation of the US in a climate regime is not likely, at least in the short run. The US is more likely to adopt unilateral policies than to join the present Kyoto coalition (even when it includes China). However, a two bloc regime would become the most preferred option if both China and the US, for some political or environmental reasons, decide to cooperate on GHG emission control. If the US decides to cooperate, the climate regime that provides the highest economic incentives to the cooperating countries is the one in which China and the US cooperate bilaterally, with the Annex B-US countries remaining within the Kyoto framework.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.unive.it/media/allegato/DIP/Economia/Working_papers/Working_papers_2006/WP_DSE_Buchner_Carraro_07_06.pdf
File Function: First version, 2006
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari" in its series Working Papers with number 2006_07.

as in new window
Length: 41 pages
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ven:wpaper:2006_07

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Cannaregio, S. Giobbe no 873 , 30121 Venezia
Phone: +39-0412349621
Fax: +39-0412349176
Email:
Web page: http://www.unive.it/dip.economia
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Agreements; Climate; Incentives; Negotiations; Policy;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Buonanno, Paolo & Carraro, Carlo & Castelnuovo, Efrem & Galeotti, Marzio, 2000. "Emission Trading Restrictions with Endogenous Technological Change," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 2514, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Zvi Griliches, 1984. "R & D, Patents, and Productivity," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number gril84-1.
  3. Alan S. Manne & Richard G. Richels, 1999. "The Kyoto Protocol: A Cost-Effective Strategy for Meeting Environmental Objectives?," The Energy Journal, International Association for Energy Economics, International Association for Energy Economics, vol. 0(Special I), pages 1-23.
  4. Böhringer, Christoph & Löschel, Andreas, 2001. "Market power in international emissions trading : the impact of U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol," ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research 01-58, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  5. EYCKMANS, Johan & TULKENS, Henry, 1999. "Simulating coalitionally stable burden sharing agreements for the climate change problem," CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 1999026, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  6. Barbara Buchner & Silvia Dall’Olio, 2004. "Russia: The Long Road to Ratification. Internal Institution and Pressure Groups in the Kyoto Protocol’s Adoption Process," Working Papers, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 2004.151, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  7. Nordhaus, William D & Yang, Zili, 1996. "A Regional Dynamic General-Equilibrium Model of Alternative Climate-Change Strategies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 86(4), pages 741-65, September.
  8. Buonanno, Paolo & Carraro, Carlo & Galeotti, Marzio, 2003. "Endogenous induced technical change and the costs of Kyoto," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 11-34, February.
  9. Goulder, Lawrence H. & Mathai, Koshy, 2000. "Optimal CO2 Abatement in the Presence of Induced Technological Change," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 1-38, January.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Lessmann, Kai & Edenhofer, Ottmar, 2011. "Research cooperation and international standards in a model of coalition stability," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 36-54, January.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ven:wpaper:2006_07. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Geraldine Ludbrook).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.