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The Political Economy of Conditionality: An Empirical Analysis of World Bank Enforcement

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  • Kilby, Christopher

    () (Department of Economics, Vassar College)

Abstract

Traditional aid conditionality has been attacked as ineffective in part because aid agencies--notably the World Bank--often fail to enforce conditions. This pattern undermines the credibility of conditionality, weakening incentives to implement policy reforms. The standard critique attributed this time inconsistency to bureaucratic factors within the aid agency such as pressure to lend, defensive lending, or short-sighted altruism. Pressure from powerful donors provides another potential explanation for lax enforcement. This paper presents and empirical analysis of the political economy of conditionality enforcement in international organizations using the case of the World Bank and the United States. The analysis examines panel data on World Bank disbursements to 97 countries receiving structural adjustment loans between 1984 and 2005. Using macroeconomic variables to measure compliance and UN voting as an indicator of alignment with the U.S., this paper presents evidence that the World Bank enforces structural adjustment conditions more vigorously in countries not aligned with the United States.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Vassar College Department of Economics in its series Vassar College Department of Economics Working Paper Series with number 92.

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Handle: RePEc:vas:papers:92

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  1. Robert K. Fleck & Christopher Kilby, 2006. "World Bank Independence: A Model and Statistical Analysis of US Influence," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(2), pages 224-240, 05.
  2. Frey, Bruno S. & Schneider, Friedrich, 1986. "Competing models of international lending activity," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 225-245, March.
  3. Thomas Barnebeck Andersen & Henrik Hansen & Thomas Markussen, 2006. "US politics and World Bank IDA-lending," The Journal of Development Studies, Taylor and Francis Journals, vol. 42(5), pages 772-794.
  4. Svensson, Jakob, 2003. "Why conditional aid does not work and what can be done about it?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 381-402, April.
  5. Mavrotas, George & Villanger, Espen, 2006. "Multilateral Aid Agencies and Strategic Donor Behaviour," Working Papers DP2006/02, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
  6. Svensson, Jakob, 1997. "When is foreign aid policy credible : aid dependence and conditionality," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1740, The World Bank.
  7. Thomas Barnebeck Andersen & Thomas Harr & Finn Tarp, 2004. "On US politics and IMF Lending," Discussion Papers 04-11, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
  8. Gilbert,Christopher L. & Vines,David (ed.), 2006. "The World Bank," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521029018.
  9. Collier, Paul & Hoeffler, Anke, 2002. "Aid, policy, and growth in post-conflict societies," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2902, The World Bank.
  10. Christopher Kilby, 2006. "Donor influence in multilateral development banks: The case of the Asian Development Bank," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 1(2), pages 173-195, June.
  11. Canavire-Bacarreza, Gustavo & Nunnenkamp, Peter & Thiele, Rainer & Triveño, Luis, 2006. "Assessing the allocation of aid : developmental concerns and the self-interest of donors," Open Access publications from Kiel Institute for the World Economy info:hdl:10419/3983, Kiel Institute for the World Economy.
  12. Axel Dreher, 2004. "A Public Choice Perspective of IMF and World Bank Lending and Conditionality," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 119(3_4), pages 445-464, 06.
  13. Axel Dreher & Nathan Jensen, 2005. "Independent Actor or Agent? An Empirical Analysis of the impact of US interests on IMF Conditions," KOF Working papers 05-118, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
  14. Judson, Ruth A. & Owen, Ann L., 1999. "Estimating dynamic panel data models: a guide for macroeconomists," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 9-15, October.
  15. Thomas Eisensee & David Strömberg, 2007. "News Droughts, News Floods, and U.S. Disaster Relief," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 122(2), pages 693-728, 05.
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Cited by:
  1. Elio Londero, 2009. "Some Implications of Multilateral Financing to the Private Sector without Sovereign Guarantee," ICER Working Papers 08-2009, ICER - International Centre for Economic Research.

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