Intergenerational Intermediation and Altruistic Preferences
AbstractThe paper analyzes the intermediation role of government under the assumption that it has an advantage over the private sector in collecting uncollateralized loan payments. It isshown that a government loan program may improve the welfare of all generations (including the current old generation) if agents care about future generations in the time inconsistent manner originally proposed by Phelps and Pollak (1968). Numerical examples suggest that the welfare gains from intervention may be quite large and depends on the degree of altruism as defined by Phelps and Pollak. The welfare gains are large when agents are relatively ï¿½egoisticï¿½ because in this case the time inconsistency problem is more severe and there is more room for intervention.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Vanderbilt University Department of Economics in its series Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers with number 1108.
Date of creation: Aug 2011
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Intermediation; Inconsistent Altruistic Behavior; Investment in Children; Government Loan Program;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- E21 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomics: Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Consumption; Saving; Wealth
- E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
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