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Externalities And Asymmetric Information

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Author Info

  • GREENWOOD, J.
  • MCAFEE, R.P.

Abstract

A reconsideration of the Pigovian theory of regulating externalities via taxation is undertaken for environments with private information. The presence of private information may have no effect on the social optimum; but when it has an impact, it is to cause a group of different agents to share the same production or consumption levels. The model developed provides an appealing characterization of when such situations transpire; they occur when the individuals who desire most to engage in some activity are the ones who society least wants to participate. Since such instances could potentially be regulated by the imposition of quantity controls, this may explain authorities' apparent predilection for quantity limits rather than tax-cum-subsidy schemes to manage many externalities. Copyright 1991, the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University of Western Ontario, The Centre for the Study of International Economic Relations in its series University of Western Ontario, The Centre for the Study of International Economic Relations Working Papers with number 8914.

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Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: 1989
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:uwo:wocier:8914

Contact details of provider:
Postal: The Centre for the Study of International Economic Relations, Social Science Centre, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada N6A 5C2
Phone: 519-661-2111 Ext.85244
Web page: http://economics.uwo.ca/

Related research

Keywords: fiscal policy ; information ; economic models;

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Cited by:
  1. Roberton Williams, 2002. "Prices vs. Quantities vs. Tradable Quantities," NBER Working Papers 9283, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Chung-Huang Huang, 1996. "Effectiveness of environmental regulations under imperfect enforcement and the firm's avoidance behavior," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 8(2), pages 183-204, September.
  3. Michel Poitevin, 1995. "Contract Renegotiation and Organizational Design," CIRANO Working Papers, CIRANO 95s-03, CIRANO.
  4. Roberto Burguet & Preston McAffee, 2005. "License Prices for Financially Constrained Firms," Working Papers 224, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  5. Favard, P. & Mirabel, F. & Poudou, J.-C., 2002. "Funding for Universal Service Obligations in Electricity Sector: the case of green power development," Cahiers du LASER (LASER Working Papers), LASER (Laboratoire de Science Economique de Richter), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1 2002.06, LASER (Laboratoire de Science Economique de Richter), Faculty of Economics, University of Montpellier 1.

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