Externalities And Asymmetric Information
AbstractA reconsideration of the Pigovian theory of regulating externalities via taxation is undertaken for environments with private information. The presence of private information may have no effect on the social optimum; but when it has an impact, it is to cause a group of different agents to share the same production or consumption levels. The model developed provides an appealing characterization of when such situations transpire; they occur when the individuals who desire most to engage in some activity are the ones who society least wants to participate. Since such instances could potentially be regulated by the imposition of quantity controls, this may explain authorities' apparent predilection for quantity limits rather than tax-cum-subsidy schemes to manage many externalities. Copyright 1991, the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Western Ontario, The Centre for the Study of International Economic Relations in its series University of Western Ontario, The Centre for the Study of International Economic Relations Working Papers with number 8914.
Length: 21 pages
Date of creation: 1989
Date of revision:
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Postal: The Centre for the Study of International Economic Relations, Social Science Centre, University of Western Ontario, London, Ontario, Canada N6A 5C2
Phone: 519-661-2111 Ext.85244
Web page: http://economics.uwo.ca/
fiscal policy ; information ; economic models;
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