Follow the Leader: Steady State Analysis of a Dynamic Social Network
AbstractA social pyramid is show to be the unique steady state social structure when agents gain utility from being early adopters of subsequently popular trends. The environment is related to a majority game, but introduces the importance of the timing of adoption. Utility derived from making a popular choice independent of timing is demonstrated as essential to support the hierarchy. The proposed environment is relevant to a number of settings in which leadership and timing of decisions are important or where being perceived as a trend setter is rewarded. The leadership position can be self-reinforcing. For a professional critic, for example, a cult-of personality can dictate popular tastes, such as in art, food, and wine markets. A social hierarchy can also apply to the introduction of new products or ideas including academic research and financial market analysts.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Finance Discipline Group, UTS Business School, University of Technology, Sydney in its series Working Paper Series with number 158.
Date of creation: 01 Jan 2009
Date of revision:
dynamic network; social interaction; consumer choice;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-01-24 (All new papers)
- NEP-NET-2009-01-24 (Network Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2009-01-24 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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