Do medical doctors respond to economic incentives?
AbstractA longitudinal analysis of married physicians labor supply is carried out on Norwegian data from 1997 to 1999. The model utilized for estimation implies that physicians can choose among 10 different job packages which are a combination of part time/full time, hospital/primary care, private/public sector, and not working. Their current choice is influenced by past available options due to a taste persistence parameter in the utility function. In the estimation we take into account the budget constraint, including all features of the tax system. Our results imply that an overall wage increase or a tax cut moves married physicians towards full time job packages, in particular to full time jobs in the private sector. But the overall and aggregate labor supply elasticities in the population of employed doctors are rather low compared to previous estimates
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Turin in its series Department of Economics Working Papers with number 201206.
Length: 41 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2012
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Andreassen, Leif & Di Tomasso, Maria Laura & Strøm, Steinar, 2012. "Do Medical Doctors Respond to Economic Incentives?," Memorandum 32/2012, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- Leif Andreassen & Maria Laura Di Tommaso & Steinar Strøm, 2012. "Do Medical Doctors Respond to Economic Incentives?," CESifo Working Paper Series 3802, CESifo Group Munich.
- J22 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Time Allocation and Labor Supply
- I10 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - General
- C35 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions
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