On Institutional Designs and Corruption by Imitation
AbstractImitation is the sincerest form of flattery, and we claim the corruption is driven by imitative behavior for those agents facing an institutional design of corruption. So this paper analyzes an individual level approach and tackles the question of why people engage in corrupt exchange. We show that institutional design determines corruption and that there exists a threshold level in order to imitate the noncorrupt (honest) behavior.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Siena in its series Department of Economics University of Siena with number 616.
Date of creation: Sep 2011
Date of revision:
Corrupt behavior; Evolutionary dynamics; Imitative behavior; Institutions and operations;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, and Operations
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- P37 - Economic Systems - - Socialist Institutions and Their Transitions - - - Legal
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-11-21 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2011-11-21 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EVO-2011-11-21 (Evolutionary Economics)
- NEP-PKE-2011-11-21 (Post Keynesian Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Karl H. Schlag, .
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- Mishra, Ajit, 2006. "Persistence of corruption: some theoretical perspectives," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 349-358, February.
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