Power and the Analysis of the Food System
AbstractThis paper stresses that in order to understand the current restructuring processes in the food system it is necessary to take explicitly into account the role of power as a driving organizational force. Agricultural economics, drawing pervasively on the walrasian model, has mainly analysed power in the form of market and bargaining power. Stemming from different definitions of power, the paper focuses on some definitions suggested by the new institutional economics and the network theory, showing their relevance to the analysis of the food market
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, University of Siena in its series Department of Economics University of Siena with number 478.
Date of creation: Apr 2006
Date of revision:
power; scale-free networks; new institutional economics;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Institutional; Evolutionary
- L66 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Food; Beverages; Cosmetics; Tobacco
- Z13 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology; Social and Economic Stratification
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGR-2006-05-13 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-ALL-2006-05-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2006-05-13 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-NET-2006-05-13 (Network Economics)
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