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Cooperation with Strategy-Dependent Uncertainty Attitude

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Author Info
Nicola Dimitri ()
Abstract

The paper shows that in a Prisoner’s Dilemma Knightian uncertainty, formalised by multiple priors, may entail cooperation at a generalised Nash Equilibrium. The main idea is that players may have an attitude towards uncertainty that depends upon their available strategies. In particular, if players anticipate to be sufficiently more optimistic when choosing to cooperate, than when defecting, then they may indeed cooperate. Though uncommon in economic modelling, choice-dependent uncertainty attitude formalises a behaviour which is well understood and widely accepted by cognitive psychologists, within the theory of Cognitive Dissonance.

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Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Siena in its series Department of Economics University of Siena with number 457.

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Date of creation: Jul 2005
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Handle: RePEc:usi:wpaper:457

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Related research
Keywords: Cooperation; Cognitive Dissonance; Equilibrium; Games; Uncertainty;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Schmeidler, David, 1989. "Subjective Probability and Expected Utility without Additivity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(3), pages 571-87, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Lo, Kin Chung, 1999. "Extensive Form Games with Uncertainty Averse Players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 256-270, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Lo, Kin Chung, 1996. "Equilibrium in Beliefs under Uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 443-484, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Marinacci, Massimo, 2000. "Ambiguous Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 191-219, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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