Principio di corrispondenza fiscale, popolazione non residente e tributi locali
AbstractAccording to the Decentralization Theorem, local governments are more efficient than centralized ones in providing local public services, since resident citizens’ needs differ from those of citizens from other places. Local governments may better meet residents’ needs than a central government can do. A crucial issue may arise from the presence of non-voting (that are “non-resident”) citizens amongst the local population, thus affecting the implementation of the equivalence principle (Olson, 1969). The manifold effects of the presence of NRP (non- resident population) may variously affect public budget management as well as private economy both of a municipality and of its resident population (RP). Since NRP has a serious impact on efficiency/efficacy of public expenditure for services, it would be also worth evaluating its capacity of funding local public expenditure in terms of both current and future taxation. In funding local bodies the central government may opt for charging residents with a heavier burden of taxation than NRP (i.e., by partly replacing transfers with a share in Irpef). On the other hand, NRP’s features together with a different composition of population across municipalities may induce governments to supply balancing transfers aimed to partly compensate differences between actual taxable incomes within the local environment. Incoming NRP flows may thus affect municipalities’ politics and some dynamics are likely to have critical impacts on equilibrium budgets, even if choices are often shaped by higher economic resources eventually available to municipalities themselves.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economic Policy, Finance and Development (DEPFID), University of Siena in its series Department of Economic Policy, Finance and Development (DEPFID) University of Siena with number 0308.
Date of creation: Jan 2008
Date of revision:
Taxation; State and Local Taxation; Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations; Geographic Labour mobility;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- H7 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations
- J6 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers
- R23 - Urban, Rural, Regional, Real Estate, and Transportation Economics - - Household Analysis - - - Regional Migration; Regional Labor Markets; Population
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-05-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2008-05-17 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-GEO-2008-05-17 (Economic Geography)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.Access and download statisticsgeneral information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Carlo Zappia).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.