Transatlantic trade disputes seem to be a rising concern. According to the most critical voices, they provoke notable "trade wars" and crucially impair the credibility of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. In this paper, we suggest that such conclusions are unwarranted. Violation of WTO agreements and non-compliance with Dispute Settlement Body rulings should be considered as an instrument for renegotiation with unique features, providing indispensable flexibility to the world trading system. Such flexibility is necessary because of incomplete contracting and "local" lack of commitment at the time of concluding agreements.
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Find related papers by JEL classification: F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order; Noneconomic International Organizations;; Economic Integration and Globalization: General F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations K33 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - International Law
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Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, 1992.
"Protection For Sale,"
NBER Working Papers
4149, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Grossman, G.M. & Helpman, E., 1992.
"Protection for Sale,"
Papers
162, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Public and International Affairs.